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Strategies for Approval : Building Support for Military Intervention at the UN Security Council. 国連安保理での軍事介入のための支援の構築
・ISBN 978-0-300-27058-7 hard US$ 85.00
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お気に入り
★★★
| 著者・編者 | Recchia, Stefano, |
|---|---|
| 出版社 | (Yale U. Pr., US) |
| 出版年月 | 2025.10 |
| ページ数 | 304 pp. |
| 言語 | ENG |
| ニュース番号 | ＜748-634＞ |
解説
A thoughtful analysis of how major powers can obtain UN Security Council approval for military intervention
Powerful states often seek UN Security Council approval for their military interventions to enhance legitimacy, but how can they secure this approval when veto-wielding permanent members have grave misgivings? In this groundbreaking study of UNSC diplomacy, Stefano Recchia tackles this question by drawing on hundreds of declassified documents and interviews that he conducted with top diplomats from multiple countries.
Recchia demonstrates that since the early 1990s, powerful states facing significant opposition at the UNSC have not been able to rely solely on economic and political leverage to obtain a resolution of approval. Instead, they have had to combine exertions of leverage with credible signals that they would act with restraint and in line with core international norms. This often required that they agree to incorporate costly limitations on the use of force, such as time limits and multilateral oversight, into the requested resolution. Recchia argues that for better or worse accepting such constraints will be critical in the future if powerful countries, including the United States, are to secure UN approval in an increasingly competitive international environment.
Powerful states often seek UN Security Council approval for their military interventions to enhance legitimacy, but how can they secure this approval when veto-wielding permanent members have grave misgivings? In this groundbreaking study of UNSC diplomacy, Stefano Recchia tackles this question by drawing on hundreds of declassified documents and interviews that he conducted with top diplomats from multiple countries.
Recchia demonstrates that since the early 1990s, powerful states facing significant opposition at the UNSC have not been able to rely solely on economic and political leverage to obtain a resolution of approval. Instead, they have had to combine exertions of leverage with credible signals that they would act with restraint and in line with core international norms. This often required that they agree to incorporate costly limitations on the use of force, such as time limits and multilateral oversight, into the requested resolution. Recchia argues that for better or worse accepting such constraints will be critical in the future if powerful countries, including the United States, are to secure UN approval in an increasingly competitive international environment.