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The central argument in this book, first published in 1965, is that the Israelis invaded Egypt in 1956 because they could see no other feasible way out of their predicament: they believed that Egypt, either alone or together with other Arab states, would move to destroy them once it had acquired sufficient arms. Seven years earlier, Israel had negotiated and signed separate armistice agreements with each of its four Arab neighbours, bringing into effect an armistice regime designed to 'facilitate the transition to permanent peace in Palestine'. Using considerable unpublished material, the author traces the course of Arab-Israeli relations from the fighting in 1948 to the invasion in 1956. He examines in detail Israel's relations with each of its Arab neighbours: separate chapters deal with the armistice regime, the abortive peace talks, the struggle for the Jordan River waters, the refugee problem and the boycott and blockade of Israel. The final chapters trace the growing determination of the new Egyptian government under Nasser to continue hostilities against Israel, and the manoeuvring of the Western powers in the light of this determination coupled with the entrance of the Soviet Union into the arena of Middle Eastern politics.