株式会社極東書店トップ商品一覧Inconsistency, Asymmetry, and Non-Locality: A Philosophical Investigation of Classical Electrodynamics.

商品詳細

Inconsistency, Asymmetry, and Non-Locality: A Philosophical Investigation of Classical Electrodynamics.

Inconsistency, Asymmetry, and Non-Locality: A Philosophical Investigation of Classical Electrodynamics.

・ISBN 978-0-19-517215-7 hard US$ 145.00

¥33,973.- (税込) (※)価格はご注文時の参考価格となります。
納品価格につきましては書籍の入荷時点で確定となります。
版元の原価改定、外国為替の変動等により異なる場合がございますので、予めご了承下さい。

お気に入り
電子版あり 大学・学術機関向け電子ブック(eBook)ISBN 9780199835294
著者・編者Frisch, Mathias,
シリーズ (Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Science)
出版社 (Oxford University Press Inc, US)
出版年月2005
ページ数222 pp.
言語ENG
ニュース番号<A00-63278>

解説

Mathias Frisch provides the first sustained philosophical discussion of conceptual problems in classical particle-field theories. Part of the book focuses on the problem of a satisfactory equation of motion for charged particles interacting with electromagnetic fields. As Frisch shows, the standard equation of motion results in a mathematically inconsistent theory, yet there is no fully consistent and conceptually unproblematic alternative theory. Frisch describes in detail how the search for a fundamental equation of motion is partly driven by pragmatic considerations (like simplicity and mathematical tractability) that can override the aim for full consistency. The book also offers a comprehensive review and criticism of both the physical and philosophical literature on the temporal asymmetry exhibited by electromagnetic radiation fields, including Einstein's discussion of the asymmetry and Wheeler and Feynman's influential absorber theory of radiation. Frisch argues that attempts to derive the asymmetry from thermodynamic or cosmological considerations fail and proposes that we should understand the asymmetry as due to a fundamental causal constraint. The book's overarching philosophical thesis is that standard philosophical accounts that strictly identify scientific theories with a mathematical formalism and a mapping function specifying the theory's ontology are inadequate, since they permit neither inconsistent yet genuinely successful theories nor thick causal notions to be part of fundamental physics.