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The Senate : From White Supremacy to Governmental Gridlock.
・ISBN 978-0-8139-4689-4 hard US$ 109.50
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お気に入り
★★★
・ISBN 978-0-8139-4690-0 paper US$ 40.00
￥9,372.- (税込) ※（※）価格はご注文時の参考価格となります。
納品価格につきましては書籍の入荷時点で確定となります。
版元の原価改定、外国為替の変動等により異なる場合がございますので、予めご了承下さい。
お気に入り
★★★
| 著者・編者 | Wirls, Daniel, |
|---|---|
| シリーズ | Constitutionalism and Democracy |
| 出版社 | (U. Virginia Pr., US) |
| 出版年月 | 2021.10 |
| ページ数 | 278 pp. |
| 言語 | ENG |
| ニュース番号 | ＜669-930＞ |
解説
In this lively analysis, Daniel Wirls examines the Senate in relation to our other institutions of government and the constitutional system as a whole, exposing the role of the "world's greatest deliberative body" in undermining effective government and maintaining white supremacy in America.
As Wirls argues, from the founding era onward, the Senate constructed for itself an exceptional role in the American system of government that has no firm basis in the Constitution. This self-proclaimed exceptional status is part and parcel of the Senate's problematic role in the governmental process over the past two centuries, a role shaped primarily by the combination of equal representation among states and the filibuster, which set up the Senate's clash with modern democracy and effective government and has contributed to the contemporary underrepresentation of minority members.
As he explains, the Senate's architecture, self-conception, and resulting behavior distort rather than complement democratic governance and explain the current gridlock in Washington, D.C. If constitutional changes to our institutions are necessary for better governance, then how should the Senate be altered to be part of the solution rather than part of the problem? This book provides one answer.
As Wirls argues, from the founding era onward, the Senate constructed for itself an exceptional role in the American system of government that has no firm basis in the Constitution. This self-proclaimed exceptional status is part and parcel of the Senate's problematic role in the governmental process over the past two centuries, a role shaped primarily by the combination of equal representation among states and the filibuster, which set up the Senate's clash with modern democracy and effective government and has contributed to the contemporary underrepresentation of minority members.
As he explains, the Senate's architecture, self-conception, and resulting behavior distort rather than complement democratic governance and explain the current gridlock in Washington, D.C. If constitutional changes to our institutions are necessary for better governance, then how should the Senate be altered to be part of the solution rather than part of the problem? This book provides one answer.