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This edited work draws on?a range of?contributed expertise to?trace the?fortune of?an Aristotelian thesis over different periods in the?history of?philosophy. It presents eight cases of?direct or indirect challenges to?the?Aristotelian passive account of?human cognition, taking the?reader from?late antiquity to?the 20th century. Chapters analyse the?(often indirect) effect of?Aristotle’s account of?cognition on?later periods. In his influential De anima, Aristotle describes human cognition, both sensitive and intellectual, as the?reception of?a form in the?cognitive subject. ? Aristotle’s account has been commonly interpreted as fundamentally passive ? the?cognitive subject is a passive actor upon which a cognitive process is acted by?the?object. However, at?least from?the?time of?Alexander of?Aphrodisias onwards, this interpretation has been challenged by?authors who posit a fundamental active aspect of?cognition. Readers will discover how one or more of?three concerns ? ontological superiority, direct realism and moral responsibility ? drive the?active accounts of?cognition. Contributed chapters from?top scholars examine how these three concerns lead thinkers to?take issue with?the?idea that cognition is a passive process. The?authors consider Jesuit accounts of?cognition, Malebranche on?judgment, and Wittgenstein on?perception, as well as Stumpf on?active cognition, among other relevant works. ? This book is ideally suited to?scholars of?philosophy, especially those with?an interest in medieval epistemology, the?influence of?Aristotle, philosophy of?mind and theories of?cognition.