株式会社極東書店トップ商品一覧Self-Consciousness and Objectivity: An Introduction to Absolute Idealism.

商品詳細

Self-Consciousness and Objectivity: An Introduction to Absolute Idealism.

Self-Consciousness and Objectivity: An Introduction to Absolute Idealism. 自己意識と客観性-絶対的観念論入門

・ISBN 978-0-674-97651-1 cloth US$ 53.00

¥12,417.- (税込) (※)価格はご注文時の参考価格となります。
納品価格につきましては書籍の入荷時点で確定となります。
版元の原価改定、外国為替の変動等により異なる場合がございますので、予めご了承下さい。

お気に入り
著者・編者Rödl, Sebastian,
出版社(Harvard U. Pr., US)
出版年月2018
ページ数176 pp.
言語ENG
ニュース番号<640-P315>

解説

Self-Consciousness and Objectivity undermines a foundational dogma of contemporary philosophy: that knowledge, in order to be objective, must be knowledge of something that is as it is, independent of being known to be so. Sebastian Roedl revives the thought-as ancient as philosophy but largely forgotten today-that knowledge, precisely on account of being objective, is self-knowledge: knowledge knowing itself. Thus he intervenes in a discussion that runs through the work of Bernard Williams, Thomas Nagel, Adrian Moore, and others, who seek to comprehend the claim to objectivity we raise in making judgments. While these authors think that the quest for objectivity demands that we transcend the first person, Roedl argues that it is through the first-person thought contained in every judgment that our judgments possess the objectivity that defines knowledge.

Self-Consciousness and Objectivity can be read as an introduction to absolute idealism, for it dismantles a stubborn obstacle to absolute idealism's reception: the notion that it is a species of idealism, which is understood to be the assertion that the world depends upon the mind. As Roedl brings out, absolute idealism is the resolute rejection of that idea.

The implications of this work are profound. It undercuts a number of contemporary presumptions, such as that judgment is a propositional attitude, that inference is a mental process, and that there is an empirical science of the capacity for objective knowledge. All of these presumptions flow from the erroneous notion that the objectivity of knowledge stands opposed to its first-person character.