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Monotonicity Failures Afflicting Procedures for Electing a Single Candidate.

Monotonicity Failures Afflicting Procedures for Electing a Single Candidate.

・ISBN 978-3-319-51060-6 paper

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著者・編者Felsenthal, Dan S. / Nurmi, H.,
シリーズSpringerBriefs in Economics
出版社(Springer, GW)
出版年月2017
ページ数88 pp.
言語ENG
ニュース番号<638-1594 638-P2724>

解説

This book provides an evaluation of 18 voting procedures in terms of the most important monotonicity-related criteria in fixed and variable electorates. All voting procedures studied aim at electing one out of several candidates given the voters' preferences over the candidates. In addition to (strict) monotonicity failures, the vulnerability of the procedures to variation of the no-show paradoxes is discussed. All vulnerabilities are exemplified and explained. The occurrence of the no-show paradoxes is related to the presence or absence of a Condorcet winner. The primary readership of this book are scholars and students in the area of social choice.