株式会社極東書店トップ商品一覧Tangled Governance : International Regime Complexity, the Troika, and the Euro Crisis.

商品詳細

Tangled Governance

Tangled Governance : International Regime Complexity, the Troika, and the Euro Crisis. C.R.ヘニング著 国際体制の複雑性、トロイカ、ユーロ危機

・ISBN 978-0-19-880180-1 hard GB£ 42.99

¥13,619.- (税込) (※)価格はご注文時の参考価格となります。
納品価格につきましては書籍の入荷時点で確定となります。
版元の原価改定、外国為替の変動等により異なる場合がございますので、予めご了承下さい。

お気に入り

電子版あり 大学・学術機関向け電子ブック(eBook)ISBN 978-0-19-184038-8

著者・編者Henning, C. Randall,
出版社(Oxford U. Pr., UK)
出版年月2017
ページ数316 pp.
言語ENG
ニュース番号<636-539 636-L569>

解説

Tangled Governance addresses the institutions that were deployed to fight the euro crisis, reestablish financial stability in Europe, and prevent contagion to the rest of the world. Henning explains why European leaders chose to include the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the crisis response and provides a detailed account of the decisions of the institutions that make up the troika (the European Commission, European Central Bank, and IMF). He examines the institutions negotiating strategies, the outcomes of their interaction, and the effectiveness of their cooperation. The institutional strategies of key member states, including Germany and the United States, are also explored in this study. The book locates its analysis within the framework of regime complexity, involving clusters of overlapping and intersecting regional and multilateral institutions. It tests conjectures in the regime-complexity literature against the seven cases of financial rescues of euro area countries that were stricken by crises between 2010 and 2015. Tangled Governance concludes that states use some institutions to control others, that complexity is the consequence of a strategy to control agency drift. States mediate conflicts among institutions and thereby limit fragmentation of the regime complex and underpin substantive efficacy. In reaching these conclusions, the book also answers several key puzzles, including why Germany and other northern European countries supported IMF inclusion despite its adopting positions opposed to their preferences; why crisis fighting arrangements endured intense conflicts among the institutions; and, finally, why the United States and the IMF promoted further steps to complete the monetary union.