商品詳細

This book examines US intelligence as a vital part of why the Vietnam War began. What did the so called 'best and brightest' know when they brought the United States into the Vietnam War? While historians have been debating this question for nearly five decades, intelligence - a key element in policymakers' perceptions - remains understudied and little understood. This can be partly explained by the oft repeated claim by former CIA officers that although the intelligence was sound, policy was not necessarily based on the evidence. Any inquiry into US misperceptions, they imply, should be focused on policymakers rather than the intelligence community. In contrast, this book shows that the causes of the war cannot be fully understood without recognising the part played by US intelligence as a major source of the disparity between the reality of the Vietnam conflict and what policymakers in Washington believed and hoped. It is the first evidence based book to examine US intelligence as a part of the origins of the Vietnam War. It covers the 3 major departments involved - the Pentagon, the State Department and the CIA - and the key historical events pertinent to the origins of the Vietnam War. It analyses intelligence and its use in wider policy contexts. It provides a measured assessment of the successes and the failures of the intelligence community.