株式会社極東書店トップ ＞ 商品一覧 ＞ Independence in Crisis : The Argentinean Central Bank and Their Accountability for Bureaucratic and Political Decisions, 1991 - 2007.
商品詳細
Independence in Crisis : The Argentinean Central Bank and Their Accountability for Bureaucratic and Political Decisions, 1991 - 2007. アルゼンチンの中央銀行と官僚的・政治的 意思決定のためのその説明責任 1991～2007年
・ISBN 978-3-631-63826-2 hard SFR 56.35
￥16,239.- (税込) ※（※）価格はご注文時の参考価格となります。
納品価格につきましては書籍の入荷時点で確定となります。
版元の原価改定、外国為替の変動等により異なる場合がございますので、予めご了承下さい。
お気に入り
★★★
| 著者・編者 | Rodríguez López, Juan Miguel, |
|---|---|
| 出版社 | (P. Lang, SZ) |
| 出版年月 | 2012 |
| ページ数 | xii, 192 pp. |
| 言語 | ENG |
| ニュース番号 | ＜599-1295 599-293＞ |
解説
Central bankers like the idea of low inflation, but their actions have a distribution effect of richness. During the 1990s, the independence of central banks increased. What have central banks done with this independence? When we infer that all actors have interests, whether governments, voters or interest groups, why would we assume that central banks are technocratic institutions maximizing the welfare of the state? To answer these questions, this study looks at the Argentinean Central Bank between 1991 and 2007 and researches the incentives of a central bank to act strategically. This book uses a model which is an adaptation of Helmke's model (2002, 2005) for the Supreme Court of Justice. An inter-temporal conflict of interest explains the Central Bank's behavior.