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The part that RAF doctrine played in preparing the Air Force for war has been the subject of considerable criticism, based largely on the RAF's early performance. Little detailed analysis of the actual content of the RAF doctrine has been attempted. This book examines the evolution of this doctrine at the strategic and operational levels over the period 1919-1939, beginning with its RFC and RNAS antecedents from the First World War. Use of consistent methodology allows an effective comparison of three major doctrine publications produced by the Service during the period - RAF Operations Manual, The War Manual of the RAF and the second edition of the same. The RAF has been bitterly criticised for becoming obsessed in the early years with a strategic bombing doctrine. This book presents a scholarly and far more nuanced approach to this doctrine and it tells about the personalities who dominated the early RAF. It also shows how the RAF tried to influence the other services, the politicians and the media - and above all the public.