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Rules and Restraint : Government Spending and the Design of Institutions. ルールと制約-財政支出と制度の設計
・ISBN 978-0-226-68259-4 cloth US$ 74.00
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お気に入り
★★★
・ISBN 978-0-226-68260-0 paper US$ 32.00
¥7,497.- (税込) ※(※)価格はご注文時の参考価格となります。
納品価格につきましては書籍の入荷時点で確定となります。
版元の原価改定、外国為替の変動等により異なる場合がございますので、予めご了承下さい。
お気に入り
★★★
電子版あり 大学・学術機関向け電子ブック(eBook)ISBN 978-0-226-68261-7
| 著者・編者 | Primo, David M., |
|---|---|
| シリーズ | American Politics and Political Economy |
| 出版社 | (U. Chicago Pr., US) |
| 出版年月 | 2007 |
| ページ数 | 203 pp. |
| 言語 | ENG |
| ニュース番号 | <545-416> |
解説
Government spending has increased dramatically in the United States since World War II despite the many rules intended to rein in the insatiable appetite for tax revenue most politicians seem to share. Drawing on examples from the federal and state governments, "Rules and Restraint" explains in lucid, nontechnical prose why these budget rules tend to fail, and proposes original alternatives for imposing much-needed fiscal discipline on our legislators. One reason budget rules are ineffective, David M. Primo shows, is that politicians often create and preserve loopholes to protect programs that benefit their constituents. Another reason is that legislators must enforce their own provisions, an arrangement that is seriously compromised by their unwillingness to abide by rules that demand short-term sacrifices for the sake of long-term gain. Convinced that budget rules enacted through such a flawed legislative process are unlikely to work, Primo ultimately calls for a careful debate over the advantages and drawbacks of a constitutional convention initiated by the states - a radical step that would bypass Congress to create a path toward change.