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Choosing Environmental Policy : Comparing Instruments and Outcomes in the United States and Europe. 環境政策を選ぶ-欧米の手段と結果を比較する
・ISBN 978-1-891853-87-6 cloth GB£ 171.99
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お気に入り
★★★
・ISBN 978-1-891853-88-3 paper GB£ 54.99
¥17,420.- (税込) ※(※)価格はご注文時の参考価格となります。
納品価格につきましては書籍の入荷時点で確定となります。
版元の原価改定、外国為替の変動等により異なる場合がございますので、予めご了承下さい。
お気に入り
★★★
電子版あり 大学・学術機関向け電子ブック(eBook)ISBN 978-1-936331-46-8
| 著者・編者 | Harrington, Winston / Morgenstern, R. D. / Sterner, T. (eds.), |
|---|---|
| 出版社 | (Resources for the Future, US) |
| 出版年月 | 2004 |
| ページ数 | 300 pp. |
| 言語 | ENG |
| ニュース番号 | <512-1637> |
解説
The two distinct approaches to environmental policy include direct regulation-sometimes called 'command and control' policies-and regulation by economic, or market-based incentives. This book is the first to compare the costs and outcomes of these approaches by examining realworld applications. In a unique format, paired case studies from the United States and Europe contrast direct regulation on one side of the Atlantic with an incentivebased policy on the other. For example, Germany's direct regulation of SO2 emissions is compared with an incentive approach in the U.S. Direct regulation of water pollution via the U.S. Clean Water Act is contrasted with Hollands incentive-based fee system. Additional studies contrast solutions for eliminating leaded gasoline and reducing nitrogen oxide emissions, CFCs, and chlorinated solvents. The cases presented in Choosing Environmental Policy were selected to allow the sharpest, most direct comparisons of direct regulation and incentive-based strategies. In practice, environmental policy is often a mix of both types of instruments. This innovative investigation will interest scholars, students, and policymakers who want more precise information as to what kind of 'blend' will yield the most effective policy. Are incentive instruments more efficient than regulatory ones? Do regulatory policies necessarily have higher administrative costs? Are incentive policies more difficult to monitor? Are firms more likely to oppose market-based instruments or traditional regulation? These are some of the important questions the authors address, often with surprising results.