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This book offers a penetrating re-examination of Anglo-Soviet relations between 1951 and 1955, with a special focus on the Kremlin's motivation for resisting Winston Churchill's attempts to accomplish East-West detente. This new study uses previously unseen Soviet evidence and shows how and why this period was viewed as unripe for detente. It also examines why the Soviet Union and the West were unwilling to accommodate each other and consolidated their own power blocs. It casts light onto Moscow's inexorable attitude towards the West, arguing that it was not the result of revolutionary romanticism, as many scholars are currently arguing. Rather it resulted from fears of external aggression and from an increasingly insecure leadership. This fascinating book also exposes how the Soviets perceived British power and influence and Churchill's personal political agenda. This book shows how, after Stalin's death in 1953, detente remained a distant reality. The collective leadership was keen to reduce international tensions without modifying its predecessor's foreign policy or abandoning Soviet strongholds in Central and Eastern Europe. It also examines why, as part of its peace offensive, the Kremlin was prepared to improve the atmosphere in relations with Britain but not engage in any peaceful initiative of Churchill's that may have led to detente. Written in clear and concise language, this new book brings this fascinating period to life for a new generation of readers. This book will be of great interest to all students of post-war relations and diplomacy, the history of the Soviet-Union, and of international relations and strategic studies in general.