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Appointing Central Bankers : The Politics of Monetary Policy in the United States and the European Monetary Union. 中央銀行家を指名する －米国と欧州通貨同盟の金融政策の政治－
・ISBN 978-0-521-82333-3 2003 hard GB£ 99.00
￥31,363.- (税込) ※（※）価格はご注文時の参考価格となります。
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・ISBN 978-0-521-02984-1 2006 paper GB£ 34.00
￥10,771.- (税込) ※（※）価格はご注文時の参考価格となります。
納品価格につきましては書籍の入荷時点で確定となります。
版元の原価改定、外国為替の変動等により異なる場合がございますので、予めご了承下さい。
お気に入り
★★★
電子版あり 大学・学術機関向け電子ブック（eBook）ISBN 978-0-511-51052-6
| 著者・編者 | Chang, Kelly H., |
|---|---|
| シリーズ | Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions |
| 出版社 | (Cambridge U. Pr., UK) |
| ページ数 | 160 pp. |
| 言語 | ENG |
| ニュース番号 | ＜498-1058 498-297＞ |
解説
This book examines monetary policy by focusing on how the President and the Senate influence monetary policy by appointing Federal Reserve members. It attempts to answer three questions about the appointment process and its effects. First, do politicians influence monetary policy through Federal Reserve appointments? Second, who influences the process - the President alone or both the President and the Senate? Third, what explains the structure of the Federal Reserve appointment process? The test models show that the President alone, both the President and Senate, or neither, may influence monetary policy with Federal Reserve appointments. The structure of the process reflects political battles between the Democrats and Republicans regarding the centralization of authority to set monetary policy within the Federal Reserve System. The study extends the analysis to the European Central Bank and shows that the Federal Reserve process is more representative of society than the European Central Bank process.