株式会社極東書店トップ > 商品一覧 > Politicians and Poachers : The Political Economy of Wildlife Policy in Africa.
商品詳細
Politicians and Poachers : The Political Economy of Wildlife Policy in Africa. アフリカにおける野生動物保護の政治経済学
・ISBN 978-0-521-62385-8 hard GB£ 87.00
¥27,561.- (税込) ※(※)価格はご注文時の参考価格となります。
納品価格につきましては書籍の入荷時点で確定となります。
版元の原価改定、外国為替の変動等により異なる場合がございますので、予めご了承下さい。
お気に入り
★★★
・ISBN 978-0-521-66378-6 paper GB£ 29.00
¥9,187.- (税込) ※(※)価格はご注文時の参考価格となります。
納品価格につきましては書籍の入荷時点で確定となります。
版元の原価改定、外国為替の変動等により異なる場合がございますので、予めご了承下さい。
お気に入り
★★★
電子版あり 大学・学術機関向け電子ブック(eBook)ISBN 978-0-511-62564-0
| 著者・編者 | Gibson, Clark C., |
|---|---|
| シリーズ | Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions |
| 出版社 | (Cambridge U. Pr., UK) |
| 出版年月 | 1999 |
| ページ数 | 245 pp. |
| 言語 | ENG |
| ニュース番号 | <449-1209> |
解説
Although wildlife fascinates citizens of industrialized countries, little is known about the politics of wildlife policy in Africa. In this innovative book, Clark Gibson challenges the rhetoric of television documentaries and conservation organizations to explore the politics behind the creation and change of wildlife policy in Africa. This book examines what Clark views as a central puzzle in the debate: Why do African governments create policies that apparently fail to protect wildlife? Moving beyond explanations of bureaucratic inefficiency and corrupt dictatorships, Gibson argues that biologically disastrous policies are retained because they meet the distributive goals of politicians and bureaucrats. Using evidence from Zambia, Kenya, and Zimbabwe, Gibson shows how institutions encourage politicians and bureaucrats to construct wildlife policies that further their own interests. Different configurations of electoral laws, legislatures, party structures, interest groups, and traditional authorities in each country shape the choices of policymakers - many of which are not consonant with conservation. This book will appeal to students of institutions, comparative politics, natural resource policymaking, African politics, and wildlife conservationists.