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商品詳細
Central Bank Independence, Targets and Credibility : Political and Economic Aspects of Delegation Arrangements for Monetary Policy. 中央銀行の独立、目標、信頼性
・ISBN 978-1-85898-915-0 hard GB£ 101.00
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| 著者・編者 | Lippi, Francesco, |
|---|---|
| 出版社 | (E. Elgar, UK) |
| 出版年月 | 1999 |
| ページ数 | 162 pp. |
| 言語 | ENG |
| ニュース番号 | ＜448-226 453-280＞ |
解説
The author considers imperfect monetary control, rational voters, distributional issues and uncertainty about future policy objectives in his welfare analysis of central banking. The role played by the different institutional elements that contribute to the making of an independent central bank is also assessed. A distinction is made between central bank independence and targets offering new insights into how a more inflation averse monetary policy may actually be achieved. Finally, explanations for the variation of central bank independence and conservatism across different countries are provided.
This book will appeal to researchers, academics and policymakers in the fields of monetary policy, financial economics, money and banking and political economy.